Punctuation and usage are sometimes inconsistent or just plain wrong. Nevertheless, the book is generally pleasant to read. It will be a valuable addition to any library on Soviet and Russian foreign policy.

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Left Hegelianism and Marx continue to acquire followers in every new intelligentsia generation. Some reaffirm various aspects of Marx's theory, often at the expense of Engels, whom they blame for taking the theory in a scientific direction. Marxist Humanists uphold the Hegelian Marx of the 1844 manuscripts. Kevin Anderson's work belongs to their tradition. Following Raya Dunayevskaya and others, he accords Lenin the honor of having been the first Hegelian Marxist of the twentieth century. This is counterintuitive, given Lenin's apparently heavy reliance on Engels, both before and after 1915. Anderson argues that Lenin's study of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik* (Science of Logic) in 1914–15 opened his eyes and affected some of his most important theoretical works in the ensuing years. To be sure, Lenin still erred in crucial areas (some might say, all areas) because of "theoretical ambivalence." The purpose of the book, however, is not to blame Lenin for his lapses from Marxist Humanism but to show that he was the first prominent Marxist of the twentieth century to break away from the dogmatic scientific Marxism of the Second International.

Anderson's work should be taken seriously even though he cites not a single Russian source and has not seen the pertinent manuscripts. Lenin's notebooks on Hegel have been translated and Anderson has had abundant help and advice from a variety of capable scholars. Therefore, one wonders why he failed to discuss Lenin's notes of May 1920 (published and available in English translation) to Bukharin's *Ekonomika perekhodnogo perioda*, which contain a number of remarks on Bukharin's dialectical method and other germane comments. A gap of this sort, however, does not vitiate the value of the work. It is not the scholarship but some of the theoretical assumptions behind Anderson's work that needs attention.

Anderson assumes that devotion to "the dialectic" equips one to be a better revolutionary (or "liberatory") theoretician. But even if a case can be made that dialectical thinking stimulates theoretical creativity and has heuristic value, what is "the dialectic"? Dialectitians notoriously disagree, each claiming greater mastery of "the dialectic." Bukharin, for example, translated dialectic into an early variant of systems theory under the influence of Alexander Bogdanov (Malinovskii). This infuriated Lenin, who used Hegel to reinforce his own authority as teoretik. Hegelian dialectic does not guarantee that one will get everything right (left, that is); it certainly does not turn brutal dogmatists into nice people. In revolutions, people and their qualities of leadership probably count more than theory. Trotsky knew this, but was too doctrinaire to exploit his insight.

A case can be made, however, that study of Hegel inspired Lenin, and Anderson makes it (largely because dialectical terms offer great latitude for interpretation) by reviewing Lenin's theoretical positions on a series of important problems in the light of the notebooks on Hegel. To be sure, even after the notebooks, Lenin made statements reminiscent of the epistemologically benighted *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. Lenin was only episodically a Hegelian Marxist, but the impact is clearly there. When the invalid Lenin took his last trip to his Kremlin office in October 1923, he carried away three volumes of Hegel.

Anderson also traces the richly bifurcating disputes of the Left over Lenin's position as a dialectition. Even if Anderson's assumptions about dialectical method are questionable, he ably surveys the dialectical adventures of theoreticians trying to orient themselves to the seemingly endless crises of capitalism and looking for guidance in intellectual forebears. Dialectic
is infinitely malleable, eternally optimistic, and embraces a great range of intellectual creativity and political behavior. The inspirational character of dialectic remains, although many hyphenated Hegelianisms and Marxisms have fallen by the wayside.

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This book promises to provide an innovative interpretation of the ideological roots of the Soviet collapse. The author asserts that Western scholars have “marginalized” the role of ideology in the events leading to the collapse of the Soviet system and makes a case for “bringing ideology back in” as a causal factor (p. 1). The author sketches an interesting historical-ideological argument to explain the inherent contradictions that ultimately undermined Gorbachev’s perestroika. The book describes a recurring ideological dilemma for Soviet leaders. The party’s monopoly on power was justified by its historical mission to move society forward to socialism and communism. As advances were made, however, a dialectical process unfolded in which society’s maturation diminished the need for party supremacy. Thus, Soviet leaders were caught in an ideological balancing act to demonstrate, on one hand, that the party was making progress moving society ahead while, on the other hand, that it still possessed a special expertise justifying its monopoly on power. The book is especially good in elaborating the ideological concepts and debates that occurred during the perestroika years.

But how persuasive is the larger claim that ideological contradictions explain the Soviet collapse? I will confess that I was not initially sympathetic to the argument and upon reading the book have remained so. The author contends that ideology is neither doctrine nor beliefs, but a structure that is “autonomous of the agents involved in its articulation” (p. 20). Accordingly, the inertia of the late Stalin and Brezhnev periods and the dynamism of the Khrushchev and Gorbachev periods are explained by “the system’s teleological imperative” (p. 82). While it may be instructive to think about ideology as a system of discourse for a community that exists apart from any individual member, it still remains a socially constructed discourse that gives expression to underlying power and status relationships. But it is precisely at this level that the work comes up short. Ideology is divorced from a social context; instead, it is depicted as an ethereal force, moving across the historical landscape and determining the actions of political leaders, unconstrained by time or place. For example, the book well describes the ideological debate between E. K. Ligachev and A. M. Yakovlev, but does not address why two products of the same system of ideological discourse arrive at such different conceptualizations of the party’s leading role. The reader, alas, is left with an interpretation of the rise and fall of the Soviet system without personality, politics or society.

Regarding the Western literature, the book indeed offers a unique approach to explain perestroika and the subsequent collapse. But the author does not stand alone in stressing the legitimating role or the internal contradictions of the ideology. In particular, the literature review ignored two well-known works that seem especially pertinent to the argument. Ken Jowitt’s analysis of the collapse has drawn attention to a post-Stalinist process of demystification of power that sapped the emotive appeal of the party’s legitimating vanguard status. And Stephen Cohen has written insightfully of the competing tendencies within the ideology toward the “statist” socialism of Brezhnev or Ligachev and the “democratic” socialism of Dubcek or Gorbachev.

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