Summary: On the dangers facing the Kurdish movement from Erdogan’s Türkiye – Editors
Like the voices of high school students inspired by the Arab Spring 14 years ago echoing off the walls: “It’s your turn, doctor.”
The Syrian civil war, which began in March 2011, lasted about 14 years. According to a 2022 report by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), more than 610,000 people have lost their lives as a result of the war, of which 499,657 have been officially recorded. 6.6 million Syrians have been forced to leave their country. Until now, this number has continued to grow due to the ongoing conflict between regime forces and opposition groups.
However, on Sunday, December 8, an Islamist group affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and led by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani entered the capital, Damascus, declaring that the city was now “liberated.” The fall of the Assad regime, which had ruled for almost 54 years, reminded us once again of the inevitable fate that awaits all oppressive and totalitarian regimes. Having regained their independence, the Syrian people celebrated their freedom with great enthusiasm.
The fact that HTS is an active Salafi-jihadist organization raises serious concerns about the future of rights and freedoms in Syria. Given Syria’s diverse ethnic and religious composition, this raises a critical question: Can the promise of “freedom for all” be trusted in a country where so many different communities coexist?
The struggle for the freedom of ethnic minorities in the Middle East is not a new phenomenon, but it became more prominent with the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. The fact that they are being targeted not only by the regime but also by Islamist groups opposed to the regime creates a significant impasse. These conflicts are felt most intensely in regions with a predominantly Kurdish population.
The region known as Rojava, located in northern Syria and comprising the three cantons of Afrin, Kobane, and Jazira, is a predominantly Kurdish area. This region, which also shares a border with Türkiye, was declared an autonomous region shortly after the onset of the Syrian Civil War. It was divided into three self-governing cantons, each with its own democratic assembly, under the leadership of the Democratic Union Party (PYD). The PYD and its armed forces, the People’s Defense Units (YPG), have declared their aim to establish a common alternative movement for all ethnic groups based on principles of religious freedom, gender equality, human rights, and the abolition of the death penalty. For years, they have been actively engaged in military conflict against jihadist groups such as ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the al-Nusra Front.
Between September and October 2014, intense attacks by ISIS forced the displacement of more than 120,000 people, the majority of the Kurdish population living in Afrin. This period coincided with what was known as the “settlement process” or “Kurdish Initiative,” during which a ceasefire between Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Turkish government was still in effect.
In response to the escalating ISIS attacks in northern Syria, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which represented the majority of Kurds living in Türkiye, called on the Turkish government to establish a safe corridor to facilitate military aid to the region. On October 4, 2014, PYD co-chair Salih Muslim also similarly appealed to the Turkish government for assistance. Despite the ongoing ceasefire, these calls were ignored, and ISIS’s violence continued to escalate.
On October 5, following the Kobani massacre, the HDP headquarters in Türkiye called for street protests. Demonstrations began in eastern provinces such as Van, Diyarbakır, Muş, Batman, and Siirt, later spreading to Istanbul. Clashes took place between protesters and security forces that resulted in deaths. On October 7, 2014, HDP Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtaş delivered a speech in which he included a passage from Abdullah Öcalan’s letter. In his speech, Demirtaş emphasized that while the party supported the protests, it was crucial to stop the violence and seek a peaceful resolution. As a result, the protests were brought to an end on the same day. On October 20, 2014, the Turkish government permitted Peshmerga forces from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to enter Kobani to assist in the city’s defense. With the support of the United States, ISIS was pushed out of much of northern Syria during the first months of 2015.
On the other hand, Demirtaş’s public statements, the unexpected rise of the HDP as the third party in the presidential and general elections of the same year, and HDP’s support, which extended beyond Kurdish circles to include various minority groups in Türkiye, signified the end of the ‘settlement process’. Indeed, towards the end of 2015, investigations into the Kobani incidents were intensified, and preparations were made to lift the parliamentary immunity of HDP co-chairs and members of parliament. This action triggered a new wave of protests, and long-term curfews were quickly imposed in Kurdish-majority provinces where the protests occurred. The resulting deaths of civilians, human rights violations, and clashes in cities besieged by soldiers and police drew significant attention in the international press. In response to these events, the statement “We Will Not Be a Party to This Crime “ was issued on January 11, 2016, and it received support from many academics and intellectuals worldwide. On November 4, 2016, HDP MPs, including co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, whose parliamentary immunity had been lifted, were found guilty of various charges, including “disrupting the unity and integrity of the state and country,” “propaganda for a terrorist organization,” and “inciting hatred and enmity,” leading to their arrest. Demirtaş was sentenced to 42 years in prison, while Yüksekdağ received a 30-year sentence. Additionally, 406 academics, known as “Academics for Peace,” who had signed the “We Will Not Be a Party to This Crime” statement, were dismissed from their positions for “propaganda for a terrorist organization.”
Meanwhile, the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army/ Syrian National Army (SNA) took steps in 2016 to establish a safe zone in northern Syria and fight against Syrian government forces. With the PYD considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish government as an extension of the PKK, Turkish armed forces and the SNA targeted the YPG and PYD, leading to violent clashes that continued through 2019. Although the clashes do not continue with the same intensity today due to U.S. mediation, last week, the Turkish Armed Forces and SNA launched an operation on Manbij, located west of the Euphrates, leading to the withdrawal of PKK and YPG forces from the area. The Turkish government emphasized that capturing Manbij and Tel Rifaat was a vital step toward establishing a 30-kilometer-deep security zone. In the coming period, it remains to be seen how the cooperation between the Turkish Armed Forces and SNA will impact the Kurds and other minority groups living along the Turkish border.
But what is apparent is that after the fall of the Syrian regime, the Turkish Foreign Ministry declared that “the complete elimination of the YPG is Türkiye’s strategic goal.” The open meetings in Damascus between the head of Turkish intelligence and Jolani, the leader of HTS — also listed as a terrorist organization in Türkiye — have raised serious concerns among the Kurdish population in the region. These concerns are not unfounded, given Jolani’s known links to Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and al-Nusra, his support for jihad, and his advocacy for an Islamic state. His approach to governance, rooted in the rules of Islamic law, poses a direct threat to the coexistence of Alawite, Shiite, Druze, Christian, and other religious minorities in Syria.
Furthermore, although HTS’s rhetoric about a “free Syria” and its emphasis on “brotherly life” appears promising, it seems unlikely that the group will be able to make its decisions independently. In an interview with a well-known Turkish journalist on December 13, former PYD co-chair Salih Muslim stated that he recognized HTS’s new flag and expressed openness to ceasefires and positive communication. He called on the Syrian people to live together in all their religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity. However, he also noted that the Turkish government had yet to respond positively to formal requests for a meeting.
Only a few hours after this interview was published in Türkiye, the journalist who conducted it was arrested, and the interview was deleted from all platforms. This development was interpreted as the Turkish government’s indirect response to Salih Muslim’s call for dialogue.
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